Overview
What this node currently publishes at the enterprise domain.
| Issuer DID | — |
| Signing key | — |
| Issuer | — |
Published endpoints
These are served live from this node. While it is down, verifiers cannot fetch them and verification fails everywhere.
Issue credential
Signed with the node's P-256 key. The subject is whoever the credential is about, and must be a DID.
Named fields become withholdable by the holder. Nothing is disclosable by default: a field the holder can withhold is one a verifier cannot rely on.
Issued & revocation
Every credential this node has issued, from the status list's allocation map. This mapping is never published — the public status list is only an opaque bitstring.
| # | Subject | Issued | State |
|---|
Indices are never reused. Revoking one credential does not affect any other.
Identities
DIDs this enterprise issues to the things it owns. Each resolves under the root's own namespace, so subordination is structural rather than a claim the child makes about its parent — and the root signs a delegation saying what it may do.
Public key only. If it contains a d field it is a private key —
this will refuse it, and you should treat that key as compromised.
| DID | Kind | Custody | State |
|---|
Held credentials
Credentials issued to us by someone else — a trust anchor attesting one of our identities. Everything else in this console is about what we issue; this is the other half. Paste the JWT the issuer gave you. It is checked against the key published at the issuer's own DID document, and refused unless the subject is an identity this node manages.
Currently held
| Subject | Type | Issuer | Valid until | Public URL |
|---|
Configuration
Superadmin only. Changing the issuer DID after credentials exist breaks verification for every one of them.
Signing key
P-256 / ES256. Written to disk at mode 600 and never displayed, transmitted or logged — only the public JWK and thumbprint, which are what you check the published DID document against.
Rotation archives the current key beside itself and is never a delete. Credentials signed by it stop verifying once its verification method is unpublished.
Users
admin issues and revokes. superadmin also manages keys, users and configuration — a bad issuance is revocable, a minted root key is not.
| Username | Role | Last sign-in |
|---|
Audit log
Who did what, and when. Deliberately never records what was created, so a generated key or password cannot end up here.
| Time | Actor | Action | Target | Outcome |
|---|